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Abstract
In several European merger cases competition authorities have de-
manded that the merging rm auctions o¤virtual capacity. The buyer
of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-
specied price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold
in the market in competition with the merging rm.
The paper compares sale of physical and virtual capacity by the
merging rm and shows that virtual capacity makes tacit collusion eas-
ier. The reason is that the auction price on virtual capacity increases,
when the merging rm reduces production in order to increase the
output price. This reduces its temptation to deviate.
Keywords: Virtual Capacity, Tacit Collusion, Anti-trust, Mergers,
Competition Policy
JEL: L40, L41, D44
Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK
1455 Copenhagen K. e-mail: cs@econ.ku.dk, web: www.econ.ku.dk/cschultz, phone
+4535323039
1
1 Introduction
It is common in merger cases that the competition authority requires dom-
inant rms to sell o¤ capacity, so that its market share does not grow (too
much). Recently, several European merger cases in electricity markets have
resulted in the sale of virtual capacity in the form of so called Virtual Power
Plants (VVP). The aim of this paper is to investigate, whether the compet-
itive e¤ects of these requirements are as good as the selling of real physical
capacity. Tacit collusion - or coordinated interaction - is a major worry in
merger cases; see for instance the horizontal merger guidelines published by
Department of Justice (1997). We are interested in whether the possibilty of
tacit collusion is a¤ected by the fact that the capacity is virtual and not in
the form of ownership of the capacity.
Virtual capacity is an option to buy products (e.g. electricity) at a pre-
determined price per unit (typically equal to marginal cost), which the buyer
then sells in the nal product market in competition with the producer.
In the European electricity examples, auctions are held at regular intervals
(several times a year).
When the virtual capacity is auctioned, the recipient of the revenue is the
large merging rm. If the auction is e¢ cient, the price for the virtual capacity
will equal the expected prot - suitably adjusted for risk etc. - from having
access to the capacity. So although the merging rm meets competition in
the market from the virtual competitor, it will pocket the prots made by
the competitor in the auction. This potentially has e¤ects on the incentives
to collude. The paper investigates this.
The paper provides a simple model of a market with one producing rm.
The producing rm rst auctions o¤ virtual capacity and then the rm and
the virtual producer competes in the market. For simplicity we consider a
2
Cournot model, where the rms choose production and the price is set in
the market. We rst consider a static market. There the competitive e¤ects
of introducing the virtual producer are equivalent to those of introducing an
independent producer who owns his capacity. The reason is simple. Once
the auction is held, the payment in the auction is sunk and everything is as
if there are two independent rms in the market. In line with the European
examples alluded to, we consider the case where the virtual capacity is small
relative to the market, so that the virtual producer wants to market his whole
capacity. In principle one could conceive of large virtual producers, but this
has not been demanded by competitive authorities yet and is left for future
research.
Secondly, we consider tacit collusion. Since the virtual capacity typi-
cally is auctioned o¤ for relatively short periods and there are many bidders,
we rst consider the case where the virtual producers do not participate in
tacit collusion. They are assumed to be short run players, who just market
whatever capacity they have. Clearly, this makes it more di¢ cult to main-
tain tacit collusion. In the standard case with two independent rms, tacit
collusion cannot be implemented without the cooperation of both rms. If
one rm plays a best response, the best the other can do is to play best
response and this results in the Cournot equilibrium. With virtual capacity
this logic breaks down. Since the big (merging) rm sells the virtual capacity
it will pocket the expected prot to be earned on the virtual capacity. If it
acts moderately in the market and lowers production, the price will rise. In
fact it can induce the monopoly price by selling the monopoly output minus
the virtual capacity it has sold o¤. Then the market price will equal the
monopoly price, and the virtual producer will net the monopoly price minus
marginal (virtual) cost times virtual capacity. In a repeated game where this
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happens in each period, the participants in the auction will realize this and
the revenue of the big selling rm will equal the high earnings of the vir-
tual producer. In this way the big producer can realize the whole monopoly
prot. Of course, it has an incentive to deviate in a given period. When it
has auctioned o¤ the virtual capacity in a period, there is an incentive to
produce more than the low level giving rise to the monopoly price. However,
there will be a future punishment, as future bidders in the auction will realize
that monopoly prots cannot be earned in the market; they will only bid the
virtual producers Cournot prot. We show that this punishment is su¢ cient
for the big producer to restrain production and maintain monopoly prots if
the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. This is a very general result, which
just assumes that the monopoly prot exceeds the Cournot prot.
We also show that if the discount factor is lower than the crucial value,
which allows the rm to reap the monopoly prot, the highest obtainable
price and prot are increasing in the discount factor.
For given time preference, the relevant discount factor in the model de-
pends on the duration of the contracting period for the virtual capacity. The
longer the duration, the smaller is the relevant discount factor. It therefore
follows that a shorter duration of contract for virtual capacity facilitates tacit
collusion. The reason is intuitive: Tacit collusion implies that the virtual ca-
pacity is sold for a high price in the auction in the expectation that total
market production will be low, so that the product price as well as prot
will be high. The big producer is tempted to increase production in order to
increase the share of current prots. The punishment is that such behavior
will be expected in the future so the auction price for virtual capacity will
fall. This punishment rst commences in the next auction. The farther in
the future it is, the less this punishment hurts.
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If the small rm is an independent producer, who owns his own capacity,
and the rm is short sighted, tacit collusion is impossible. It therefore follows
that virtual capacity in itself facilitates tacit collusion if the small rm is a
short run player.
Of course, one may argue that it is not reasonable to assume that the small
rm will be a short run player, who will not participate in tacit collusion, if
the rm owns its own capacity. In this case it will be in the market for many
periods, and be interested in future prots. A non-trivial question here is how
the rms share production - and prots - when they collude on the monopoly
outcome. We assume that they split the market in the same proportion as
they do in the Cournot equilibrium. This would for instance be the case in
a split the surplus bargain where the Cournot outcome is the threat point.
This complicates the model somewhat, and we resort to a linear specication.
For this case we show that the minimum discount factor allowing collusion
for monopoly prots is higher if the small rm is independent than if it is
a virtual producer. So in this comparison, virtual capacity also facilitates
collusion.
In the linear specication it is, however, also true that the minimal dis-
count factor necessary for tacit collusion on the monopoly prot is higher
when the small producer is a short run player with virtual capacity than
when he is a long run player with own capacity. Hence, an auction for-
mat which ensures a lot of competition among the potential bidders, so they
become short-sighted, is important for promoting the competitive e¤ects of
introducing virtual capacity.
As stated above, virtual capacity has been introduced in a number of
recent European merger cases. In relation to Electicite de Frances (EDF)
purchase of 34,5% of the shares in the German utility EnBW, EDF agreed
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to make 6.000 MW of virtual capacity available in France by November 2003
in order to increase competition in the market. EDF was at the time selling
to around 90% of the so-called free costumers in the French market. The
virtual capacity is to be auctioned to companies who will act as sellers in
the French power market. The contracts for virtual capacity have durations
of 3, 6, 12, 24 and 36 months. The rst auction for 1.200 MW took place
in September 2001. As of April 2004 11 auctions have been held. The
auctions are organized as ascending clock auctions. Around 30 energy traders
and suppliers competed in previous auctions, which were conducted over the
Internet, with approximately 20 bidders emerging as successful purchasers.
According to agreement with the European Commission, EDF shall pro-
vide virtual capacity for a period of ve years. The French electricity market
is then expected to have developed so that su¢ cient competition will be
present without the Virtual Capacity (see Electricité de France, 2004).
Due to the Electricity Supply Boards (ESB) dominance in the Irish power
market, the Irish government has initiated the Virtual Independent Power
Producer Auction (VIPP), a form of virtual capacity auction as in France.
The auctions - where independent suppliers can bid for 600 MW out of a
total of 4.500 MW - are intended to reduce ESBs market power until more
independent suppliers enter the market (see European Commission, Madrid
Forum, 2002).
In 2003, the Belgian Competition Council approved that a subsidiary of
Electrabel became the default supplier for the customers of several inter-
municipal distribution companies. As Electrabel has a very large market
share in Belgium it was agreed that Electrabel should o¤er, via auctions,
up to a maximum of 1,200 MW of virtual power plant (VPP) capacity in
Belgium. The terms are to a large extent similar to the French, in particular
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capacity shall be o¤ered for a period of ve years (see Konkurrencestyrelsen,
2004).
The Dutch electricity producer Nuon agreed with competition authorities
that it would auction 900 MW virtual capacity in order to be allowed to buy
Reliant and its 3500 MW capacity. Again there is a ve year limit on the
requirement. The Dutch market size is around 20.000 MW, (Konkurrences-
tyrelsen, 2004)
In March 2004 the large Danish producer Elsam agreed to auction o¤ 600
MW virtual capacity in order to be allowed to make an indirect purchase of
36% of the shares in the other big Danish producer E2, see Konkurrences-
tyrelsen (2004). The total Danish market size is about 7000 MW. As in the
other countries auctions are to be held regularly, and for varying durations all
below three years. The Danish rules specify that a single buyer at most must
acquire 300 MW. The agreement with the competition authorities stipulates
that the virtual producer can buy electricity at the lowest marginal cost ob-
tainable in the di¤erent plants owned by Elsam. Contrary to the previously
mentioned cases, the Danish competition authorities required that the vir-
tual capacity should be provided indenitely. This makes worries about tacit
collusion potentially more important as there will be no end game e¤ects.
There is a long literature on tacit collusion, see Tirole (1991) for an
overview. The detection of tacit collusion in electriciy markets have been
the subject of a number of papers including Green and Newbury (1992),
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram
(1999), and Fabra and Toro (2004). To the best of my knowledge the issue of
virtual capacity and tacit collusion has not been considered in the literature.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and derives the static solution. Tacit collusion with virtual capacity
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and short run players is considered in section 3. Section 4 contains the case
where the small producer is independent. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Basics: The static market
We consider a market with two rms, a big rm 1, who sells some virtual
capacity q2. The buyer of the capacity, rm 2, is also called the virtual rm.
Both rms sell in a nal market. The amount sold by rm 1 in the nal
market is denoted q1: The price in the nal market is given by the inverse
demand curve p (Q) where Q is total production. For some - but not all - of
the results we will rely on the linear specication
p (Q) = a  bQ;
where a and b are two positive parameters. Although Theorem 1 below is
valid under general concavity assumptions, we introduce the linear specica-
tion already from the start and give the results for the linear model as we go
along in order to shorten on the presentation. We will state explicitly, when
a result depends on the linear specication.
In this section we consider a single period. In a period, the timeline is
as follows. First virtual capacity in the amount q2 is sold in an auction.
After the auction, the big rm, rm 1, and the buyer of the virtual capacity,
rm 2, competes ala Cournot in the nal market. We assume that there are
su¢ ciently many potential bidders and the auction format is such that the
price of the virtual capacity equals the prot which can be earned in the
nal market with the virtual capacity. This is for instance the case if the
auction is an open English auction with at least two independent bidders.
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The virtual capacity allows the buyer to request up to q2 units at rm 1s
marginal cost c  0:
We assume that the amount of virtual capacity, q2; is so small that rm 2
is capacity constrained and wants to utilize all capacity. This assumption is
motivated by the examples discussed in the Introduction, where the virtual
producers indeed are small.
We solve the static model for the subgame perfect equilibrium, as usual
by solving backwards. After the auction, rm 2 possesses virtual capacity q2
and it sells all q2 units in the nal market. We will verify below that this is
indeed optimal. Given rm 2 sells q2 units, the problem of rm 1 is
max
q1
(p (q1 + q2)  c) q1:
The best reply is (using superscript "c" for Cournot),
qc1 (q2) =
a  c
2b
  1
2
q2; (1)
and the total production is therefore
qc1 (q2) + q2 =
a  c
2b
+
1
2
q2:
The nal price in the market is
pc =
a+ c
2
  b
2
q2: (2)
Equation (2) clearly shows that the introduction of virtual capacity lowers
the market price.
The prot to each rm is
c1 =
(a  c  bq2)2
4b
and c2 =
(a  c  bq2) q2
2
As mentioned above, we assume that q2 is so low that the virtual rm is
capacity constrained, i.e. that q2 is less than rm 20s best reply to qc1 (q2) :
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The best reply to qc1 (q2) is given by (1) with q
c
1 (q2) inserted for q2 on the
right hand side. We therefore get that 2 is capacity constrained if
q2 <
a  c
2b
  1
2

a  c
2b
  1
2
q2

or
q2 <
1
3
a  c
b
This condition says that q2 should be less than the production level of each
rm in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium. With two rms in the market
this implies that q2 should be less than 50 % of the market. This is clearly
fullled in the examples discussed in the Introduction. In the model, we
only include one successful bidder in the auction, whereas in the examples
discussed in the introduction, there typically were many. As long as the
virtual producers use all capacity, the results derived here would not change
if we introduced more virtual producers with total capacity q2: This would
just lead to a more cumbersome notation, so we refrain from that.
Now we look at the auction stage. The prospective buyers are rational
and foresee that the Cournot equilibrium will arise and that the prot, which
can be earned from the virtual capacity is c2. Under the assumption that
the auction is competitive, the price of the capacity will equal this prot.
The total prot to rm 1 from own sales and the sale of the virtual
capacity therefore equals
c1 + 
c
2 =
(a  c)2   (bq2)2
4b
We see that the larger the virtual capacity, the lower is the total prot of
rm 1. This is of course just a mirror of the lower price. Virtual capacity
enhances the competitiveness of the static market.
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3 Tacit collusion with virtual capacity
In this section we consider tacit collusion when there is virtual capacity.
There are innitely many periods t = 0; :::;1:
At rst we will assume that the auction format and the many participants
in the auction means that the winner of the virtual capacity has a short
horizon. She can not be sure to win the next auction and will therefore not
be willing to reduce supply in order to raise the price. She will seek to gain
as much as possible and for q2 su¢ ciently small, this means that she will
wish to supply q2. In short, the owner of the virtual capacity is not willing
to collude, she is a short run player in the language of Fudenberg, Kreps and
Maskin (1990).
Firm 1, however, is a long run player and has an incentive to keep prices
high in the market. We assume that rm 1 discounts future prots with the
discount factor ; where 0 <  < 1; and the rm is interested in the sum of
discounted future prots.
The participants in the auction has an expectation about the market price
and therefore of the prot, which can be earned using the virtual capacity.
The participants observe previous prices and as time passes, the expectations
for period t may depend on these previous prices. At time t the expectation
about prices for period t is a function of previous prices. In equilibrium,
these expectations are rational, which in this non-stochastic model means
that they are correct1.
A subgame perfect, rational expectations equilibrium of the repeated
1In principle the expectation for period t0s price can depend on the whole history of
the game (productions, prots, and prices of all previous periods). As will be clear, the
more simple formulation chosen here just simplies the exposition and does not a¤ect the
results.
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game consists of an expectation function for the participants in the auc-
tion, which is correct for all possible histories - including out of equilibrium
histories - and a strategy for the big producer which is sequentially rational
in all subgames.
First, we will nd the condition under which an equilibrium, where rm
1 earns monopoly prots in the market, exists.
Suppose that the auction participants have the following expectations
function
pt =
8<: pm if pt0 = pm 8 t0 < t or t = 0pc otherwise (3)
where
pm =
a+ c
2
is the monopoly price.
The auction participants expect that the price will be the monopoly price
as long as this has been the case in the past (or it is the very rst period). If
they ever see another price, they expect the Cournot price, pc; in all future.
These are trigger expectations, which punishes rm 1 if it ever oods the
market and makes the price go below pm. If the participants in the auction are
unable to collude on bidding zero, this is the hardest punishment available.
If they can collude on bidding zero for the virtual capacity an even harder
punishment is available2: We will assume that the number of participants in
the auction is su¢ ciently large that such collusion is not possible. Notice,
however, that if such collusion is possible, and rm 1 thus can be punished
even harder than assumed here, this would just make tacit collusion easier.
In this sense our assumption stacks the deck against tacit collusion.
2As is well-known the harder the punishment, the better equilibrium can be sustained.
See Abreu (1988).
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Given the expectations, rm 1 essentially has two options if the monopoly
price pm is expected for a period. Either it can choose qm1  Qm   q2; where
Qm =
1
2
a  c
b
;
is the monopoly output and get the advantage that the price expectation for
the next period will be high. Alternatively rm 1 can deviate to the best
possible production, which equals qc1 (q2) : Then the price will fall, and price
expectations for the future periods will be pc: If rm 1 chooses qm1 ; and the
price becomes pm; the prot of the virtual rm becomes
m2 = (p
m   c) q2 = a  c
2
q2:
This will be the price of the virtual capacity in a period where pm is expected.
If rm 1 chooses qm1 its total prot, from own production and selling the
virtual capacity, becomes the total monopoly prot
m = m1 + 
m
2 =
1
4
(a  c)2
b
: (4)
If rm 1 chooses qm1 in each period, it will then realize the monopoly prot in
each period. If rm 1 deviates to qc1 (q2) ; total production in the period will
be total Cournot production qc1 (q2) + q2 and the rms total prot from the
period will be c1+ 
m
2 ; as the virtual producer expected p
m and the winning
bid in the auction has been m2 : In the next period, however, expectations
will be that p = pc, so the winning bid will be c2 and the prot of rm 1
from that period and onwards will be c1 + 
c
2: The no-deviation constraint
for rm 1 therefore reads
1
1  
m  c1 + m2 +

1   (
c
1 + 
c
2) ; (5)
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which requires that rm 1s discount factor  is no less than
^ =
c1   m1
m2   c2
> 0: (6)
(Recall that when rm one produces qm1 it restricts output below q
c
1; which
is the best reply, so m1 < 
c
1).
In general, as long as the monopoly prot exceeds the sum of Cournot
prots, i.e. as long as
c1 + 
c
2 < 
m
1 + 
m
2 ;
we have that
^ =
c1   m1
m2   c2
< 1:
So if the discount factor   ^; it is possible to realize the monopoly prot
through tacit collusion. Notice, importantly, that this result does not depend
on demand and cost being linear. It holds true under general concavity
assumptions ensuring existence of Cournot equilibrium and optimum for the
monopolist, as long as monopoly prot exceeds Cournot prot.
Finally, notice that if the discount factor is high and rm 1 chooses qm1 ; the
expectation that p = pm in each period is correct. If in the past another price
has been observed and the expectation becomes p = pc; then the big rm
can only earn c2 in all future auctions regardless of its action in a period t.
The optimal level of production is therefore qc1 (q2) and the price becomes p
c
as expected. Hence the price expectation is rational also o¤ the equilibrium
path. Summarizing the result.
Theorem 1 For any demand and cost function, such that the monopoly
prot exceeds the total prot of the Cournot equilibrium the following is true:
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If the virtual rm is a short run player, there exists a subgame perfect equi-
librium, where the rm 1s total earnings equals the monopoly prot in each
period, if the discount factor  exceeds ^ given in equation (6).
The duration of a period equals the duration of the contract for the virtual
capacity. For given time preferences, discount rate r; and duration of contract
for virtual capacity, t; the relevant discount factor is
 = exp ( rt) :
This is smaller, the longer duration of the contract. A longer contract there-
fore makes it more di¢ cult to fulll the requirement that the discount factor
exceeds the crucial discount factor ^: In this sense a longer contract makes
tacit collusion more di¢ cult.
In the linear model, we can get an explicit expression for ^: Inserting the
relevant values gives
^ =
(a c bq2)2
4b
 

1
4
(a c)2
b
  a c
2
q2

a c
2
q2   (a c bq2)q22
=
1
2
(7)
This crucial discount factor does not depend on the amount of virtual ca-
pacity, q2: Hence, in the linear model, if full collusion on the monopoly price
is feasible, a larger amount of virtual capacity does not make tacit collusion
more di¢ cult. While interesting in itself, it is not a general result, it depends
on the linear specication.
Suppose that the discount factor is less than ^, so that collusion on the
monopoly price is impossible. The rm must then settle for partial collusion.
The best prot, which can be realized, fullls the incentive constraint (5)
with equality. This is equivalent to
1 + 2 = 
c
1 + 
c
2
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In order to proceed, we focus on the linear model. Then, we get the condition
(a  b (q1 + q2)  c) (q1 + q2) = ((a  b (qc1 (q2) + q2)  c) (qc1 (q2) + q2))
which has two solutions, q1 = qc1 (q2) and
q1 =
a  c
b
  q2   q2   qc1 (q2)
Inserting into the prot functions and manipulating a bit, we get that the
total prot to rm 1 from partial collusion is
1 + 2 =
(a  c)2   (bq2 (1  2))2
4b
(8)
For  = 1
2
; this gives the monopoly prot as it should. It is increasing in
 and decreasing in q2 for  < 12 : For  = 0; it equals the sum of Cournot
prots.
The price is
p =
a+ c
2
 

1
2
  

bq2 (9)
which is lower than the monopoly price and decreasing in q2 for  < 12 and
decreasing in : Thus for discount factors below 1
2
; larger virtual capacity is
pro-competitive, it lowers the market price and it lowers the total prots of
the rms.
Theorem 2 In the linear model where the virtual producer is a short run
player, the highest prot the rm 1 can obtain from partial collusion when
 < ^ = 1
2
is given by (8) and the price is given by (9). Both is increasing in
the discount factor, ; and decreasing in the amount of virtual capacity, q2:
Larger virtual capacity is therefore pro-competitive.
We conclude that when the discount factor is so low that it is impossible
to realize the monopoly prot, and the rm has to practise partial collusion,
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then the market becomes more competitive, the larger the virtual capacity
is and the lower the discount factor is. As discussed above the relevant
discount factor is lower, the longer is the duration of the contract for the
virtual capacity.
Suppose that rm 2 does not buy virtual capacity from rm 1, either
because it owns capacity itself, or because, it buys it from somewhere else. It
could, for instance, import the capacity from a neighboring country, whose
market is separated from the one we consider here. When rm 2 is a short
run player it will produce q2 in each period. Firm 1 only receives prot from
its own sale in the market and its non-deviation constraint (5) modies to
1
1  
m
1  c1 +

1  
c
1; (10)
which is equivalent with the condition
m1  c1:
As rm 2 is a short run player, who produces with all its capacity, q2; we
have that m1 < 
c
1; so the non-deviation constraint (10) cannot be fullled
for any : Tacit collusion is impossible. This is not surprising. In the Cournot
equilibrium, rm 1 is playing best reply to q2: Playing something less, must
give less prot. If this does not make rm 2 reduce its output or rm 1
receives other revenues, as is the case in the auction for the virtual capacity,
this can never be optimal.
It thus follows directly, that tacit collusion is easier when rm 2 relies on
virtual capacity sold by rm 1, than when rm 2 either owns its own capacity
or gets it from somewhere else.
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4 Tacit collusion when both rms are long
run players
The assumption that player 2 is a short run player may appear questionable
if indeed rm 2 owns its own capacity and is in the market indenitely. We
therefore now assume that both rms are long run players, and compare
the cases where rm two has virtual capacity and owns its own capacity
respectively. As we assume that the rms are not symmetric (rm 2 is the
small rm) it is an important question how the rms share the monopoly
prot in the collusive phase. A natural benchmark is when the rms share
the market in the collusive phase in the same way as they do in the absence
of collusion. This would be the case if one conceives of equal split bargaining
taking as the threat point the non-collusive prots. We will focus on this
case below. In this case the market share of rm 1 is
s1 =
qc1 (q2)
qc1 (q2) + q2
;
and the production of each rm in the collusive - monopolistic - phase is qml1 =
s1Q
m; qml2 = (1  s1)Qm: The prots are correspondingly ml1 = s1m; ml2 =
(1  s1)m:
As the formulas become a little heavy-handed, we focus on the linear
model in the special case where a = 1, b = 1 and c = 0: Then
qc1 (q2) =
1  q2
2
; and Qm =
1
2
;
and
c1 (q2) =
(1  q2)2
4
; c2 (q2) =
(1  q2) q2
2
:
The productions in the collusive phase are
qml1 =
1  q2
1 + q2
1
2
and qml2 =
q2
1 + q2
:
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If a rm decides to deviate from the collusive phase, the best reply is found
using (1)
q1
 
qml2

=
1
2 (1 + q2)
; and q2
 
qml1

= q2;
and the associated prots are
dl1 =
1
4 (1 + q2)
2 ; and 
dl
2 =
1
2
 
1 + q2   2q22
 q2
1 + q2
:
If rm 2 has own capacity, the non-deviation constraint of rm 1 is
1
1   s1
m  dl1 +

1   s1
c;
which we can rewrite
1
1  
m  dl1
1
s1
+

1  
c;
while that of rm 2 is
1
1  
m  dl2
1
s2
+

1  
c:
As
dl1
1
s1
dl2
1
s2
=
1
(1  q2)2 (1 + q2   2q22)
> 1;
we have that
dl1
1
s1
> dl2
1
s2
;
so that the constraint for rm 1 is the most binding constraint.
Inserting the relevant values we get
1
1  
1  q2
1 + q2
1
4
 1
4 (1 + q2)
2 +

1  
1  q2
1 + q2
(1  q2)2
4
;
which is fullled if  exceeds
i =
q2
2  2q22 + q32
: (11)
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It can be veried (see gure 1 below) that for q2 2 [0; 1=3]; i 2 [0; 1[: So if
rm 2 is independent - has its own plant - and participates in the collusion,
collusion on the monopoly price is possible if  is su¢ ciently high.
Finally, let us consider the case where there is virtual capacity and rm
two participates in the collusion. The everything is as just described, ex-
cept rm 1 gets the prots earned by rm 2 back in the auction. In the
normal phase, rm 1 reaps the whole monopoly prot, m: The relevant
non-deviation constraint is therefore
1
1  
m  dl1 + s2m +

1   (
c
1 + 
c
2) ;
and we get
1
1  
1
4
 1
4 (1 + q2)
2 +
2q2
1 + q2
1
4
+

1  
(1  q2)2
4
;
which is fullled for  exceeding.
v =
q2
2 + 4q2   q32
; (12)
which clearly belongs to [0,1[.
Comparing the two discount factors it is easily checked that for q2 2
[0; 1]; i > v. Hence tacit collusion is again easier with virtual capacity
than without.
Theorem 3 Consider the linear model with a = b = 1; and c = 0: If rm
2 is a long run player, tacit collusion on the monopoly price takes that the
discount factor exceeds i given by (11) if rm 2 owns its own plant and
that it exceeds v given by (12) if it is a virtual producer. As i > v; the
requirement to the discount factor is less when capacity is virtual.
The two crucial discount factors are plotted in the gure 1 below.
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We see from the Figure that the two crucial discount factors i and v
are below the value for ^ in the linear model, where ^ = 1
2
: In this sense
tacit collusion is easier when rm 2 is a long run player, whether it relies on
virtual capacity or not. This points to that it is important that the auction
is competitive and that the format is such that it induces shortsightedness on
the part of the buyer if one is interested in promoting the completive e¤ects
of virtual capacity.
If the discount factor is so low that collusion on the monopoly prot is
impossible, the rms can collude partially.
In this case the non-deviation constraint is fullled with equality. For
rm 1 it reads
1
1   s1 (1 + 2) = 
d
1 +

1   s1 (
c
1 + 
c
2) :
When total production in the collusive phase is Q; rm 10s production is
s1Q; while rm 20s is (1  s1)Q: The best reply for rm 1; when 2 produces
(1  s1)Q is 1 (1 s1)Q2 . Inserting this into the non-deviation constraint gives
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two solutions: the total Cournot production and
Q =
1
2 (1  q22)
 
1 + q2   q2
 
2 + q2   q22

:
The total prot is therefore
i = (1 Q)Q = 1
4
(1  q22) (1 + q22 (2  4 + q22))
(1  q22)2
:
For q2 = 0; this gives the monopoly prot, as it should. Then consider the
case where where there is virtual capacity and rm two participates in the
collusion. The non-deviation constraint is
1
1   (1 + 2) = 
d
1 + s22 +

1   (
c
1 + 
c
2)
Inserting the relevant values we again nd two solutions in Q; the Cournot
production and
Q =
1 + q2   q22   q32
2 + 4q2 + 2q22
The total prot is thus
v = (1 Q)Q = 1
4
(4q2   q2 + 3q22 + q32 + 1) (1  q22) (q2 + 1)
(2q2 + q22 + 1)
2
For q2 = 0; this again gives the monopoly prot - as it should.
The expressions for the prots are unfortunately a little heavy-handed.
Tedious mainpulations however reveal that indeed v > i for the relevant
parameter-values q2 2 [0; 1=3[ and  2 [0; 110 ]: Given the results above, this
is by now unsurprising. Numerical examples also show that these prots are
decreasing in q2 and increasing in  as expected.
5 Concluding remarks
Virtual capacity has been a new and interesting feature in major merger
cases. Competition authorities have tried to mitigate the anti-competitive
22
e¤ects of mergers by requiring that the merging rm auctions o¤ virtual
capacity to prospective competitors in the nal market. We have shown
that indeed in a static setting this has the expected competitive e¤ects. As
regards tacit collusion the picture is more blurred. The fact that the merging
rm pockets the prot of the competitor through the initial auction, gives
incentives to moderate production so that the price is kept high, the value of
the virtual capacity is enhanced and so is auction revenue. This is a further
incentive to tacit collusion, which is not present when the competitor is an
independent producer.
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